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Issues for a Catholic Bioethic comprises most of the contributions of an
international panel of thinkers to a conference held at Queen 's College,
Cambridge in July 1997 to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the
foundation of the Linacre Centre. After an introduction by the editor and
an opening address by Cardinal Thomas J. Winning, the book is divided
into a number of sections with the following topics: the ecclesiastical
context of Catholic bioethics; anthropology; sexual ethics; situating health
care; integrity in health care; law, public policy and the pro-life cause; and
di sputed questions.
In his opening address Cardinal Winning points to the Centre's
mi ssion within the Church , viz., to help " in the exposition and
development of a Catholic bioethic that will aid Catholics engaged in
health care and biomedical research understand the relevance of Catholic
teaching in resolving the moral questions which arise in the course of their
work." 1
Arguably the greatest challenge confronting Catholics in the health
care apostolate is an ancient, but ever new, vision of the human person that
seems to have become firmly lodged in contemporary (bio)ethics and
jurisprudence. It is the vision of the human person as the ultimate and
unique creator, through his will or choice, of any meaning(s) or value(s) hi s
life may have. Closely related to this vision is a theory of rights based on a
dualistic anthropology. Cardinal Winning goes to the heart of thi s
challenge when he asks: "Why is it thought justifiable to kill unborn
children, the handicapped newborn and the debilitated elderly?" He
answers as follows:
The radical justification which is now a commonplace of the
bioethical literature rests on the claim th at certai n human beings do
not have a serious right to life. For to have a serious ri ght to life, on
the view asserted, one must have developed abiliti es for
understanding, reflection and choice, since without such abiliti es one
cannot value one 's life; and it is onl y in so far as people value their
lives that the ir lives have value.( 17)

If each person takes himself to be, by definition, the absolutely autonomous
source of meaning and value, then, as Cardinal Cahal B. Daly points out,
the "very concept of universally valid moral principles is ... called into
question, so that we can say that contemporary thinking about morality
makes moral consensus in society virtually impossible, and indeed makes
it in principle impossible to call any behavior morally wrong in an absolute
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or universal sense,"(23) So we have a crisis of civilization wherein moral
relativism or subjectivism ("pluralism") is replacing moral objectivity and
universality or freedom under truth and law. What Newman called a
"liberty of self-will" has replaced moral conscience. In this way, as Pope
John Paul II noted in Veritatis Splendor, conscience is cut off from the
"inescapable claims" of moral truth and anchored instead to a dominant
human will. Cardinal Daly points out that this debasing of conscience is
found not only in the realm of sex and reproduction but also in politics, in
business and finance, in the arms trade, in the practices of terrorism, and in
the conduct of war.
Within the Church itself, Cardinal Daly adds, the modem crisis of
morality concluded with a crisis in Catholic moral theology, especially
after Humanae Vitae. Unfortunately, the logic of the dissenters' position
on contraception obliged them to adopt positions that led to the unraveling
not only of the Church's teachings on sex and marriage but its teachings on
morality in general. This weakened the Church's stand in the face of the
many grave evils confronting her in modem society.
Veritatis Splendor was the Church's response to this crisis within the
Church. The Pope emphasized the truth "that there are moral laws which
bind universally and there are behaviors which are objectively and
intrinsically evil in themselves."(30) This was followed by Evangelium
Vitae which "outlines ... a comprehensive and consistent pro-life ethics,
indeed a 'culture oflife' which will confront the growing 'culture of death'
in modem society."(31)2
Chapters six and seven are devoted to the anthropology which must
inform any humane health care policy and practice. First, John Haldane
surveys various conceptions of the human person and diverse
understandings of the relation between body and mind, soul, and person.
In good Aristotelianffhomistic fashion he argues for a non-materialist but
The
also non-immaterialist (dualist) conception of the person.
hylemorphic view, he thinks, provides a truer basis for a naturalist and
objective ethics. Although Haldane clearly thinks that the content of the
norms of human flourishing "is given by our nature" and is the basis of our
judgment on the goodness or badness of actions, he does not tell us in any
detailed way how he views the relationship between the philosophy of
human nature as a theoretical science and the principles of ethics as a
"work" of practical reason.
In his paper, Gregory Glazor (ch.7) shows how the biblical image of
man as made in the image of God exposes various dualist or monistic
conceptions of man as a pure material substance or pure spiritual substance
or a dualism of the two. He then points to the relevance of this to ethical
issues, especially those surrounding the beginning and end of life (v.g. the
care of the embryo and of PVS victims) as well as one's understanding of
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pain and suffering (vs. Stoicism and Buddhism). The view "highlights the
dangers of fabricating man according to merely human representations and
understandings of man 's nature." Man "not to be made in the ' image of
man ' but accepted as begotten (given) in the ' image of God' ."(1 07)
The topic of sexual ethics takes up chapters eight and nine. Jorge V.
Arregui presents some reflections on John Paul II's philosophical and
exegetical work on marriage and sexual love. He wades a few steps into
the debate about the possibility of deriving the "ought" from the "is" or
values from facts. Unfortunately, he gives no reason for thinking that a
pure description of facts is a "mirage" or that "there is no level of facts
apart from some order of values" or why he thinks that John Paul II "does
not think it possible to offer a pure anthropological description free from
any moral evaluation." Surely the Pope distinguishes, as does St. Thomas,
between the philosophy of human nature (De Anima) and the practical
science of ethics.
Batholomew Kiely, in his paper, points to the need for formation in
the virtue of chastity if future generations are "to enjoy trust between the
sexes, committed and stable and loving marriages, dedication of parents to
children, and the joy of making a total gift of oneself in marriage or in the
consecrated life."(l47) A sense of vocation, a respect for the body, and a
hope rising beyond immediate gratification are the general requirements
for forming this virtue and these are best situated in a context of faith.
Other particular requirements include attention to the Tradition of the
Church, sexual information that is not merely biological, prayer and
sacramental life, awareness of sin, repentance and the sacrament of
reconciliation and training in self-mastery.
In his keynote paper, Germain Grisez presents the obligation to care
for one's health as an integral part of one's personal Christian vocation to
"seek the kingdom and prepare material for it."(l52) Grisez analyzes the
nature and limits of this obligation as well as of the obligation to care for
the health of children and other dependents . He also addresses the health
care professional'S special vocation as a vocation to "dedicated
service."( 155)
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